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Abstract
We propose a logical analysis of the concept of typicality,
central in human cognition (Rosch,1978). We start from
a previously proposed extension of the basic Description
Logic ALC with a typicality operator T that allows to con-
sistently represent the attribution to classes of individuals
of properties with exceptions (as in the classic example
(i)typical birds fly, (ii) penguins are birds but (iii)typical pen-
guins don’t fly). We then strengthen this extension in order
to separately reason about the typicality with respect to dif-
ferent aspects (e.g., flying, having nice feather: in the previ-
ous example, penguins may not inherit the property of flying,
for which they are exceptional, but can nonetheless inherit
other properties, such as having nice feather).
Introduction
In (Giordano et al. 2015) it is proposed a rational closure
strengthening of ALC. This strengthening allows to per-
form non monotonic reasoning in ALC in a computation-
ally efficient way. The extension, as already the related
logic ALC + Tmin proposed in (Giordano et al. 2013a)
and the weaker (monotonic) logic ALC + T presented in
(Giordano et al. 2009), allows to consistently represent typi-
cal properties with exceptions that could not be represented
in standard ALC.
For instance, in all the above logics one can say that:
SET 1:
Typical students don’t earn money
Typical working students do earn money
Typical apprentice working students don’t earn money
without having to conclude that there cannot exist working
students nor apprentice working students. On the contrary,
in standardALC typicality cannot be represented, and these
three propositions can only be expressed by the stronger
ones:
SET 2:
Students don’t earn money (Student⊑ ¬ EarnMoney)
Working students do earn money (Worker⊓ Student⊑ EarnMoney)
Apprentice working students don’t earn money (Worker ⊓ Ap-
prentice⊓ Student⊑ ¬ EarnMoney)
These propositions are consistent in ALC only if there are
no working students nor apprentice working students.
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In all the extensions of ALC mentioned above one can
represent the set of propositions in SET 1 by means of a
typicality operator T that, given a concept C (e.g. Student)
singles out the most typical instances of C: so, for instance,
T(Student) refers to the typical instances of the concept
Student. The semantics of T is given by means of a prefer-
ence relation < that compares the typicality of two individu-
als: for any two x and y, x < y means that x is more typical
than y. Typical instances of a concept C are those minimal
with respect to < (formally, as we will see later, (T(C))I =
min<(C)
I
, where min<(C)I = {x ∈ CI : 6 ∃y ∈ CI s.t.
y < x}).
The operator T has all the properties that, in
the analysis of Kraus Lehmann and Magidor
(Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990) any non mono-
tonic entailment should have. For instance, T sat-
isfies the principle of cautious monotonicity, ac-
cording to which if T(Student) ⊑ Y oung, then
T(Student) = T(Student ⊓ Y oung)). The precise
relations between the properties of T and preferential
entailment are established in (Giordano et al. 2009).
Although the extensions of ALC with the typicality oper-
ator T allow to express SET 1 of propositions, the resulting
logic is monotonic, and it does not allow to perform some
wanted, non monotonic inferences. For instance, it does
not allow to deal with irrelevance which is the principle that
from the fact that typical students are young, one would want
to derive that typical blond students also are young, since
being blond is irrelevant with respect to youth. As another
example, when knowing that an individual, say John, is a
student, and given SET 1 of propositions, one would want
to conclude that John is a typical student and therefore does
not earn money. On the other hand, when knowing that John
is a working student, one would want to conclude that he is
a typical working student and therefore does earn money. In
other words one would want to assume that an individual is
a typical instance of the most specific class it belongs to, in
the absence of information to the contrary.
These stronger inferences all hold in the strengthen-
ing of ALC + T presented in (Giordano et al. 2013a;
Giordano et al. 2015). In particular, (Giordano et al. 2015)
proposes an adaptation to ALC of the well known mech-
anism of rational closure, first proposed by Lehman and
Magidor in (Lehmann and Magidor 1992). From a semantic
point of view, this strengthening of ALC + T corresponds
to restricting one’s attention to minimal models, that mini-
mize the height (rank) of all domain elements with respect
to < (i.e. that minimize the length of the <-chains start-
ing from all individuals). Under the condition that the mod-
els considered are canonical, the semantic characterization
corresponds to the syntactical rational closure. This seman-
tics supports all the above wanted inferences, and the nice
computational properties of rational closure guarantee that
whether the above inferences are valid or not can be com-
puted in reasonable time.
The main drawback of rational closure is that it is an all-
or-nothing mechanism: for any subclass C′ of C it holds
that either the typical members of C′ inherit all the proper-
ties of C or they don’t inherit any property. Once the typical
members of C′ are recognized as exceptional with respect to
C for a given aspect, they become exceptional for all aspects.
Consider the classic birds/penguins example, expressed by
propositions:
SET 3:
Typical birds have nice feather
Typical birds fly
Penguins are birds
Typical penguins do not fly
In this case, since penguins are exceptional with respect to
the aspect of flying, they are non-typical birds, and for this
reason they do not inherit any of the typical properties of
birds.
On the contrary, given SET 3 of propositions, one wants
to conclude that:
• (**) Typical penguins have nice feather
This is to say that one wants to separately reason about the
different aspects: the property of flying is not related to the
property of having nice feather, hence we want to separately
reason on the two aspects.
Here we propose a strengthening of the semantics used
for rational closure in ALC (Giordano et al. 2015) that only
used a single preference relation < by allowing, beside <,
several preference relations that compare the typicality of
individuals with respect to a given aspect. Obtaining a
strengthening of rational closure is the purpose of this
work. This puts strong constraints on the resulting se-
mantics, and defines the horizon of this work. In this new
semantics we can express the fact that, for instance, x is
more typical than y with respect to the property of flying but
y is more typical that x with respect to some other property,
as the property of having nice feather. To this purpose we
consider preference relations indexed by concepts that stand
for the above mentioned aspects under which we compare
individuals. So we will write that x <A y to mean that x
is preferred to y for what concerns aspect A: for instance
x <Fly y means that x is more typical than y with respect
to the property of flying.
We therefore proceed as follows: we first recall the seman-
tics of the extension ofALC with a typicality operator which
was at the basis of the definition of rational closure and
semantics in (Giordano et al. 2013b; Giordano et al. 2015).
We then expand this semantics by introducing several pref-
erence relations, that we then minimize obtaining our new
minimal models’ mechanism. As we will see this new se-
mantics leads to a strengthening of rational closure, allow-
ing to separately reason about the inheritance of different
properties.
The operator T and the General Semantics
Let us briefly recall the logic ALC + TR which is at
the basis of a rational closure construction proposed in
(Giordano et al. 2015) forALC. The intuitive idea ofALC+
TR is to extend the standardALC with concepts of the form
T(C), whose intuitive meaning is that T(C) selects the typ-
ical instances of a concept C, to distinguish between the
properties that hold for all instances of concept C (C ⊑
D), and those that only hold for the typical such instances
(T(C) ⊑ D). TheALC+TR language is defined as follows:
CR := A | ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬CR | CR ⊓ CR | CR ⊔ CR | ∀R.CR |
∃R.CR, and CL := CR | T(CR), where A is a concept
name and R a role name. A KB is a pair (TBox, ABox).
TBox contains a finite set of concept inclusions CL ⊑ CR.
ABox contains a finite set of assertions of the form CL(a)
and R(a, b), where a, b are individual constants.
The semantics of ALC + TR is defined in terms of rational
models: ordinary models of ALC are equipped with a pref-
erence relation < on the domain, whose intuitive meaning
is to compare the “typicality” of domain elements: x < y
means that x is more typical than y. Typical members of a
concept C, instances of T(C), are the members x of C that
are minimal with respect to < (such that there is no other
member of C more typical than x). In rational models < is
further assumed to be modular: for all x, y, z ∈ ∆, if x < y
then either x < z or z < y. These rational models character-
ize ALC +TR.
Definition 1 (Semantics of ALC +TR (Giordano et al. 2015))
A model M of ALC +TR is any structure 〈∆, <, I〉 where:
∆ is the domain; < is an irreflexive, transitive, and modular
relation over ∆ that satisfies the finite chain condition(there
is no infinite <-descending chain, hence if S 6= ∅, also
min<(S) 6= ∅); I is the extension function that maps
each concept name C to CI ⊆ ∆, each role name R to
RI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I and each individual constant a ∈ O to
aI ∈ ∆. For concepts of ALC, CI is defined in the usual
way. For the T operator, we have (T(C))I = min<(CI).
As shown in (Giordano et al. 2015), the logic ALC +TR
enjoys the finite model property and finiteALC+TR models
can be equivalently defined by postulating the existence of
a function kM : ∆ 7−→ N, where kM assigns a finite rank
to each world: the rank kM of a domain element x ∈ ∆ is
the length of the longest chain x0 < · · · < x from x to a
minimal x0 (s. t. there is no x′ with x′ < x0). The rank
kM(CR) of a concept CR in M is i = min{kM(x) : x ∈
CIR}.
A model M satisfies a knowledge base K=(TBox,ABox)
if it satisfies its TBox (and for all inclusionsC ⊑ D in TBox,
it holds CI ⊆ DI ), and its ABox (for all C(a) in ABox,
aI ∈ CI , and for all aRb in ABox, (aI , bI) ∈ RI ). A
query F (either an assertion CL(a) or an inclusion relation
CL ⊑ CR) is logically (rationally) entailed by a knowledge
base K (K |=ALC+TR F ) if F holds in all models satisfying
K .
Although the typicality operator T itself is nonmonotonic
(i.e. T(C) ⊑ D does not imply T(C ⊓ E) ⊑ D), the logic
ALC +TR is monotonic: what is logically entailed by K is
still entailed by any K ′ with K ⊆ K ′.
In (Giordano et al. 2013b; Giordano et al. 2015) the non
monotonic mechanism of rational closure has been defined
overALC+TR, which extends to DLs the notion of rational
closure proposed in the propositional context by Lehmann
and Magidor (Lehmann and Magidor 1992). The definition
is based on the notion of exceptionality. Roughly speak-
ing T(C) ⊑ D holds (is included in the rational clo-
sure) of K if C (indeed, C ⊓ D) is less exceptional than
C ⊓ ¬D. We briefly recall this construction and we refer to
(Giordano et al. 2013b; Giordano et al. 2015) for full details.
Here we only consider rational closure of TBox, defined as
follows.
Definition 2 (Exceptionality of concepts and inclusions)
Let TB be a TBox and C a concept. C is said to be excep-
tional for TB if and only if TB |=ALC+TR T(⊤) ⊑ ¬C.
A T-inclusion T(C) ⊑ D is exceptional for TB if C is
exceptional for TB . The set of T-inclusions of TB which are
exceptional in TB will be denoted as E(TB).
Given a DL TBox, it is possible to define a sequence of non
increasing subsets of TBox ordered according to the excep-
tionality of the elements E0 ⊇ E1, E1 ⊇ E2, . . . by letting
E0 = TBox and, for i > 0, Ei = E(Ei−1) ∪ {C ⊑ D ∈
TBox s.t. T does not occurr in C}. Observe that, being KB
finite, there is an n ≥ 0 such that, for all m > n,Em = En
or Em = ∅. A concept C has rank i (denoted rank(C) = i)
for TBox, iff i is the least natural number for which C is
not exceptional for Ei. If C is exceptional for all Ei then
rank(C) =∞ (C has no rank).
Rational closure builds on this notion of exceptionality:
Definition 3 (Rational closure of TBox) Let KB = (TBox,
ABox) be a DL knowledge base. The rational closure of
TBox TBox = {T(C) ⊑ D | either rank(C) < rank(C ⊓
¬D) or rank(C) =∞} ∪ {C ⊑ D | KB |=ALC+TR C ⊑
D}, where C and D are ALC concepts.
As a very interesting property, in the context of DLs, the
rational closure has a very interesting complexity: deciding
if an inclusion T(C) ⊑ D belongs to the rational closure of
TBox is a problem in EXPTIME (Giordano et al. 2015).
In (Giordano et al. 2015) it is shown that the semantics
corresponding to rational closure can be given in terms of
minimal canonicalALC +TR models. With respect to stan-
dard ALC + TR models, in these models the rank of each
domain element is as low as possible (each domain element
is assumed to be as typical as possible). This is expressed by
the following definition.
Definition 4 (Minimal models of K (with respect to TBox))
Given M =〈∆, <, I〉 and M′ = 〈∆′, <′, I ′〉 , we say
that M is preferred to M′ (M < M′) if: ∆ = ∆′,
CI = CI
′ for all concepts C, for all x ∈ ∆, it holds that
kM(x) ≤ kM′(x) whereas there exists y ∈ ∆ such that
kM(y) < kM′(y).
Given a knowledge base K = 〈TBox,ABox〉, we say
that M is a minimal model of K (with respect to TBox) if it
is a model satisfying K and there is no M′ model satisfying
K such that M′ <M.
Furthermore, the models corresponding to rational closure
are canonical. This property, expressed by the following def-
inition, is needed when reasoning about the (relative) rank of
the concepts: it is important to have them all represented.
Definition 5 (Canonical model) Given K=(TBox,ABox),a
model M =〈∆, <, I〉 satisfying K is canonical if for each
set of concepts {C1, C2, . . . , Cn}consistent with K , there
exists (at least) a domain element x ∈ ∆ such that x ∈
(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ · · · ⊓ Cn)I .
Definition 6 (Minimal canonical models (with respect to TBox))
M is a canonical model of K minimal with respect to TBox
if it satisfies K , it is minimal with respect to TBox
(Definition 4) and it is canonical (Definition 5).
The correspondence between minimal canonical models
and rational closure is established by the following key the-
orem.
Theorem 1 ((Giordano et al. 2015)) Let K=(TBox,ABox)
be a knowledge base and C ⊑ D a query. We have that
C ⊑ D ∈ TBox if and only if C ⊑ D holds in all minimal
canonical models of K with respect to TBox (Definition 6).
Semantics with several preference relations
The main weakness of rational closure, despite its power
and its nice computational properties, is that it is an all-or-
nothing mechanism that does not allow to separately reason
on single aspects. To overcome this difficulty, we here con-
sider models with several preference relations, one for each
aspect we want to reason about. We assume this is any con-
cept occurring in K: we call LA the set of these aspects (ob-
serve that A may be non-atomic). For each aspect A, <A
expresses the preference for aspect A : <Fly expresses the
preference for flying, so if we know that T(Bird) ⊑ Fly,
birds that do fly will be preferred to birds that do not fly, with
respect to aspect fly, i.e. with respect to <Fly . All these pref-
erences, as well as the global preference relation <, satisfy
the properties in Definition 7 below. We now enrich the def-
inition of an ALC + TR model given above (Definition 1)
by taking into account preferences with respect to all of the
aspects. In the semantics we can express that for instance
x <Ai y, whereas y <Aj x (x is preferred to y for aspect Ai
but y is preferred to x for aspect Aj).
This semantic richness allows to obtain a strengthening of
rational closure in which typicality with respect to every as-
pect is maximized. Since we want to compare our approach
to rational closure, we keep the language the same than in
ALC+TR. In particular, we only have one single typicality
operator T. However, the semantic richness could motivate
the introduction of several typicality operators TA1 . . .TAn
by which one might want to explicitly talk in the language
about the typicality w.r.t. aspect A1, or A2, and so on. We
leave this extension for future work.
Definition 7 (Enriched rational models) Given a knowl-
edge base K, we call an enriched rational model a structure
M = 〈∆, <,<A1 , . . . , <An , I〉, where ∆, I are defined as
in Definition 1, and <,<A1 , . . . , <An are preference rela-
tions over ∆, with the properties of being irreflexive, tran-
sitive, satisfying the finite chain condition, modular (for all
x, y, z ∈ ∆, if x <Ai y then either x <Ai z or z <Ai y).
For all <Ai and for < it holds that min<Ai (S) = {x ∈ S
s.t. there is no x1 ∈ S s.t. x1 <Ai x} and min<(S) =
{x ∈ S s.t. there is no x1 ∈ S s.t. x1 < x} and (T(C))I =
min<(C
I).
< satisfies the further conditions that x < y if:
(a) there is Ai such that x <Ai y, and there is no Aj such
that y <Aj x or;
(b) there is T(Ci) ⊑ Ai ∈ K s.t. y ∈ (Ci ⊓ ¬Ai)I , and
for all T(Cj) ⊑ Aj ∈ K s.t. x ∈ (Cj ⊓ ¬Aj)I , there is
T(Ck) ⊑ Ak ∈ K s.t. y ∈ (Ck ⊓ ¬Ak)I and kM(Cj) <
kM(Ck).
In this semantics the global preference relation < is re-
lated to the various preference relations <Ai relative to sin-
gle aspects Ai. Given (a) x < y when x is preferred
to y for a single aspect Ai, and there is no aspect Aj for
which y is preferred to x. (b) captures the idea that in case
two individuals are preferred with respect to different as-
pects, preference (for the global preference relation) is given
to the individual that satisfies all typical properties of the
most specific concept (if Ck is more specific than Cj , then
kM(Cj) < kM(Ck)), as illustrated by Example 1 below.
We insist in highlighting that this semantics somewhat
complicated is needed since we want to provide a strength-
ening of rational closure. For this, we have to respect the
constraints imposed by rational closure. One might think in
the future to study a semantics in which only (a) holds.We
have not considered such a simpler semantics since it would
no longer be a strengthening of the semantics corresponding
to rational closure, and is therefore out of the focus of this
work.
In order to be a model of K an ALCRTE model must
satisfy the following constraints.
Definition 8 (Enriched rational models of K) Given a
knowledge base K, and an enriched rational model for K
M = 〈∆, <,<A1 , . . . , <An , I〉, M is a model of K if it
satisfies both its TBox and its ABox, whereM satisfies TBox
if for all inclusions C ⊑ Ai ∈ TBox: if T does not occur
in C, then CI ⊆ AiI if T occurs in C, and C is T(C′), then
both (i) min<(C′I) ⊆ AiI and (ii) min<Ai (C′
I
) ⊆ Ai
I
.
M satisfies ABox if (i) for all C(a) in ABox, aI ∈ CI , (ii)
for all aRb in ABox, (aI , bI) ∈ RI
Example 1 Let K = {Penguin ⊑ Bird,T(Bird) ⊑
HasNiceFeather, T(Bird) ⊑ F ly, T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬F ly}.
LA = {HasNiceFeather, F ly,¬F ly,Bird, Penguin}. We
consider an ALCRTE model M of K , that we don’t fully
describe but which we only use to observe the behavior of
two Penguins x, y with respect to the properties of (not) fly-
ing and having nice feather. In particular, let us consider the
three preference relations: <,<¬Fly, <HasNiceFeather .
Suppose x <¬Fly y (because x, as all typical penguins,
does not fly whereas y exceptionally does) and there is no
other aspect Ai such that y <Ai x, and in particular it does
not hold that y <HasNiceFeather x (because for instance
both have a nice feather). In this case, obviously it holds
that x < y (since (a) is satisfied).
Consider now a more tricky situation in which again
x <¬Fly y holds (because for instance x does not fly
whereas y flies), (x is a typical penguin for what concerns
Flying) but this time y <HasNiceFeather x holds (because
for instance y has a nice feather, whereas x has not). So x
is preferred to y for a given aspect whereas y is preferred to
x for another aspect. However, x enjoys the typical proper-
ties of penguins, and violates the typical properties of birds,
whereas y enjoys the typical properties of birds and violates
those of penguins. Being concept Penguin more specific than
concept Bird, we prefer x to y, since we prefer the individ-
uals that inherit the properties of the most specific concepts
of which they are instances. This is exactly what we get: by
(b) x < y holds.
Logical entailment for ALCRTE is defined as usual: a
query (with form CL(a) or CL ⊑ CR) is logically entailed
by K if it holds in all models of K , as stated by the follow-
ing definition. The following theorem shows the relations
betweenALCRTE and ALC +TR. Proofs are omitted due
to space limitations.
Theorem 2 If K |=ALC+TR F then also K |=ALCRTE F .
If T does not occur in F the other direction also holds: If
K |=ALCRTE F then also K |=ALC+TR F .
The following example shows that ALCRTE alone is not
strong enough, and this motivates the minimal models’
mechanism that we introduce in the next section. In the
example we show that ALCRTE alone does not allow us
to perform the stronger inferences with respect to rational
closure mentioned in the Introduction (and in particular, it
does not allow to infer (**), that typical penguins have a
nice feather).
Example 2 Consider the above Example 1. As said in the
Introduction, in rational closure we are not able to reason
separately about the property of flying or not flying, and the
property of having or not having a nice feather. Since pen-
guins are exceptional birds with respect to the property of
flying, in rational closure which is an all-or-nothing mech-
anism, they do not inherit any of the properties of typical
birds. In particular, they do not inherit the property of hav-
ing a nice feather, even if this property and the fact of fly-
ing are independent from each other and there is no reason
why being exceptional with respect to one property should
block the inheritance of the other one. Does our enriched
semantics enforce the separate inheritance of independent
properties?
Consider a model M in which we have ∆ =
{x, y, z}, where x is a bird (not a penguin) that flies
and has a nice feather (x ∈ BirdI , x ∈ FlyI , x ∈
HasNiceFeatherI, x 6∈ PenguinI), y is a penguin that
does not fly and has a nice feather (y ∈ PenguinI, y ∈
BirdI , y 6∈ FlyI , y ∈ HasNiceFeatherI), z is
a penguin that does not fly and has no nice feather
(z ∈ PenguinI, z ∈ BirdI , z 6∈ FlyI , z 6∈
HasNiceFeatherI). Suppose it holds that x <Fly y,
x <Fly z, x <HasNiceFeather z, y <HasNiceFeather z,
and x < y, x < z, y < z. It can be verified that
this is an ALCRTE model, satisfying T(Penguin) ⊑
HasNiceFeather (since the only typical Penguin is y, in-
stance of HasNiceFeather).
Unfortunately, this is not the only ALCRTE model of K .
For instance there can be M′ equal to M except from the
fact that y <HasNiceFeather z does not hold, nor y < z
holds. It can be easily verified that this is also anALCRTE
model of K in which T(Penguin) ⊑ HasNiceFeather
does not hold (since now also z is a typical Penguin, and z
is not an instance of HasNiceFeather).
This example shows that although there are ALCRTE
models satisfying well suited inclusions, the logic is not
strong enough to limit our attention to these models. We
would like to constrain our logic in order to exclude models
like M′. Roughly speaking, we want to eliminate M′ be-
cause it is not minimal: although the model as it is satisfies
K , so y does not need to be preferred to z to satisfy K (nei-
ther with respect to < nor with respect to <HasNiceFeather),
intuitively we would like to prefer y to z (with respect to the
property HasNiceFeather, whence in this case with respect
to the global <), since y does not falsify any of the inclu-
sions with HasNiceFeather, whereas z does. This is obtained
by imposing the constraint of considering only models mini-
mal with respect to all relations <A, defined as in Definition
10 below. Notice that the wanted inference does not hold in
ALC + TR minimal canonical models corresponding to ra-
tional closure: in these models y < z does never hold (the
two elements have the same rank) and this semantics does
not allow us to prefer y to z. By adopting the restriction
to minimal canonical models, we obtain a semantics which
is stronger than rational closure (and therefore enforces all
conclusions enforced by rational closure) and, furthermore,
separately allows to reason on different aspects.
Before we end the section, similarly to what done above,
let us introduce a rank of a domain element with respect to
an aspect. We will use this notion in the following section.
Definition 9 The rank kAiM(x) of a domain element x with
respect to <Ai in M is the length of the longest chain
x0 <Ai · · · <Ai x from x to a minimal x0 (s.t. for no x′
x′ <Ai x0). To refer to the rank of an element x with respect
to the preference relation < we will simply write kM(x).
The notion just introduced will be useful in the following.
Since kAiM and <Ai are clearly interdefinable (by the previ-
ous definition and by the properties of <Ai it easily follows
that in all enriched models M, x <Ai y iff kAiM(x) <
kAiM(y), and x < y iff kM(x) < kM(y) ), we will shift
from one to other whenever this simplifies the exposition.
Nonmonotonicity and relation with rational
closure
We here define a minimal models mechanism starting from
the enriched models of the previous section. With respect to
the minimal canonical models used in (Giordano et al. 2015)
we define minimal models by separately minimizing all the
preference relations with respect to all aspects (steps (i) and
(ii) in the definition below), before minimizing < (steps (iii)
and (iv) in the definition below). By the constraints linking
< to the preference relations <A1 · · · <An , this leads to
preferring (with respect to the global <) the individuals that
are minimal with respect to all <Ai for all aspects Ai, or
to aspects of most specific categories than of more general
ones. It turns out that this leads to a stronger semantics than
what is obtained by directly minimizing <.
Definition 10 (Minimal Enriched Models) Given two
ALCRTE enriched modelsM = 〈∆, <A1 , . . . , <An , <, I〉
and M′ = 〈∆′, <′A1 , . . . , <
′
An
, <′, I ′〉 we say that M′ is
preferred to M with respect to the single aspects (and write
M′ <EnrichedAspects M) if ∆ = ∆′, I = I ′, and:
• (i) for all x ∈ ∆, for all Ai: kAiM′ (x) ≤ kAiM(x);
• (ii) for some y ∈ ∆, for some Aj , kAjM′ (y) < kAjM(y)
We let the set MinAspects = {M : there is no M′ such that
M′ <EnrichedAspects M}.
GivenM andM′ ∈MinAspects, we say thatM′ is overall
preferred to M (and write M′ <Enriched M) if∆ = ∆′,
I = I ′, and:
• (iii) for all x ∈ ∆, kM′(x) ≤ kM(x);
• (iv) for some y ∈ ∆ , kM′(y) < kM(y)
We callM a minimal enriched model of K if it is a model
of K and there is noM′ model of K such thatM′ <Enriched
M.
K minimally entails a query F if F holds in all minimal
ALCRTE models of K . We write K |=ALCRTEmin F . We
have developed the semantics above in order to overcome a
weakness of rational closure, namely its all-or-nothing char-
acter. In order to show that the semantics hits the point, we
show here that the semantics is stronger than the one corre-
sponding to rational closure. Furthermore, Example 3 below
shows that indeed we have strengthened rational closure by
making it possible to separately reason on the different prop-
erties. Since the semantic characterization of rational clo-
sure is given in terms of rational canonical models, here we
restrict our attention to enriched rational models which are
canonical.
Definition 11 (Minimal canonical enriched models of K)
An ALCRTE enriched model M is a minimal canonical
enriched model of K if it satisfies K , it is minimal
(with respect to Definition 10) and it is canonical:
for all the sets of concepts {C1, C2, . . . , Cn} s.t.
K 6|=ALCRTE C1⊓C2⊓· · ·⊓Cn ⊑ ⊥, there exists (at least)
a domain element x such that x ∈ (C1 ⊓C2 ⊓ · · · ⊓Cn)I .
We call ALCRTE + min− canonical the semantics ob-
tained by restricting attention to minimal canonical enriched
models. In the following we will write:
K |=ALCRTE+min−canonical C ⊑ D to mean that C ⊑ D
holds in all minimal canonical enriched models of K . The
following example shows that this semantics allows us to
correctly deal with the wanted inferences of the Introduc-
tion, as (**). The fact that the semantics ALCRTE +
min− canonical is a genuine strengthening of the seman-
tics corresponding to rational closure is formally shown in
Theorem 3 below.
Example 3 Consider any minimal canonical model M∗
of the same K used in Example 1.It can be easily ver-
ified that in M∗ there is a domain element y which
is a penguin that does not fly and has a nice feather
(y ∈ PenguinI, y ∈ BirdI , y ∈ HasNiceFeatherI).
First, it can be verified that y ∈ min<(PenguinI)
(by Definition 7, and since by minimality of <Fly and
<HasNiceFeather , y ∈ min<Fly (Penguin
I) and y ∈
min<HasNiceFeather (Penguin
I)). Furthermore, for all pen-
guin z that has not a nice feather, y < z (again by Definition
7, and since by minimality of <Fly and <HasNiceFeather ,
y <HasNiceFeather z). From this, in all minimal canoni-
cal ALCRTE models of K it holds that T(Penguin) ⊑
HasNiceFeather, i.e., K |=ALCRTE+min−canonical
T(Penguin) ⊑ HasNiceFeather, which was the wanted
inference (**) of the Introduction.
The following theorem is the important technical re-
sult of the paper:
Theorem 3 The minimal models semantics ALCRTE +
min− canonical is stronger than the semantics for ratio-
nal closure. Let (K = TBox,ABox). If C ⊑ D ∈ TBox
then K|=ALCRTE+min−canonicalC ⊑ D.
Proof.(Sketch) By contraposition suppose that
K 6|=ALCRTE+min−canonical C ⊑ D. Then there
is a minimal canonical enriched ALCRTE model
M = 〈∆, <A1 , . . . , <An , <, I〉 of K and an y ∈ CI
such that y 6∈ DI . All consistent sets of concepts consistent
with K w.r.t. ALCRTE are also consistent with K with
respect to ALC + TR, and viceversa (by Theorem 2).By
definition of canonical, there is also a canonicalALC +TR
model of K MRC = 〈∆, <R C, I〉 be this model. If C
does not contain the T operator, we are done: in MRC , as
inM, there is y ∈ CI such that y 6∈ DI , hence C ⊑ D does
not hold in MRC , and C ⊑ D 6∈ TBox. If T occurs in C,
and C = T(C′), we still need to show that also in MRC , as
in M, y ∈ min<RC (C′
I
). We prove this by showing that
for all x, y ∈ ∆ if x <RC y in MRC , then also x < y in
M. The proof is by induction on kMRC (x).
(a): let kMRC (x) = 0 and kMRC (y) > 0. Since x
does not violate any inclusion, also in M (by minimal-
ity of M) for all preference relations <Aj kAjM(x) = 0,
and also kM(x) = 0. This cannot hold for y, for which
kM(y) > 0 (otherwise M would violate K , against the hy-
pothesis). Hence x < y in M.
(b): let kMRC (x) = i < kMRC (y), i.e. x <RC y. As
x <RC y inMRC and the rank of x inMRC is i, there must
be a T(Bi) ⊑ Ai ∈ Ei − Ei+1 such that x ∈ (¬Bi ⊔ Ai)I
whereas y ∈ (Bi ⊓ ¬Ai)I in MRC . Before we proceed
let us notice that by definition of Ei, as well as by what
stated just above on the relation between rank of a concept
and kMRC , kMRC (Bi) = kMRC (x) . We will use this fact
below. We show that, for any inclusion T(Bl) ⊑ Al ∈ K
that is violated by x, it holds that kM(Bl) < kM(Bi), so
that, by (b), x < y.
Let T(Bl) ⊑ Al ∈ K violated by x, i.e. such that x ∈
(Bl⊓¬Al)I . SinceMRC satisfies K , there must be x′ <RC
x inMRC with x′ ∈ (Bl)I . As kMRC (x′) < i, by inductive
hypothesis, x′ < x in M. As x′ ∈ BlI , kM(Bl) ≤ kM(x′).
Since it can be shown that kM(x′) < kM(Bi), kM(Bl) <
kM(Bi), and by condition (b), it holds that x < y in M.
With these facts, since y ∈ min<(C′I) holds in M, also
y ∈ min<RC (C
′I) in MRC , hence T(C′) ⊑ D does not
hold in MRC , and C ⊑ D = T(C′) ⊑ D 6∈ TBox.
The theorem follows by contraposition.
Conclusions and Related Works
A lot of work has been done in order to extend the basic for-
malism of Description Logics (DLs) with nonmonotonic rea-
soning features (Straccia 1993; Baader and Hollunder 1995;
Donini, Nardi, and Rosati 2002; Eiter et al. 2004;
Giordano et al. 2007; Giordano et al. 2013a;
Ke and Sattler 2008; Britz, Heidema, and Meyer 2008;
Bonatti, Lutz, and Wolter 2009;
Casini and Straccia 2010; Motik and Rosati 2010;
Krisnadhi, Sengupta, and Hitzler 2011;
Knorr, Hitzler, and Maier 2012; Casini et al. 2013). The
purpose of these extensions is to allow reasoning about pro-
totypical properties of individuals or classes of individuals.
The interest of rational closure for DLs is that it pro-
vides a significant and reasonable skeptical nonmonotonic
inference mechanism, while keeping the same complex-
ity as the underlying logic. The first notion of ratio-
nal closure for DLs was defined by Casini and Straccia
(Casini and Straccia 2010). Their rational closure construc-
tion for ALC directly uses entailment in ALC over a ma-
terialization of the KB. A variant of this notion of ratio-
nal closure has been studied in (Casini et al. 2013), and
a semantic characterization for it has been proposed. In
(Giordano et al. 2013b; Giordano et al. 2015) a notion of ra-
tional closure for the logic ALC has been proposed, build-
ing on the notion of rational closure proposed by Lehmann
and Magidor (Lehmann and Magidor 1992), together with a
minimal model semantics characterization.
It is well known that rational closure has some weak-
nesses that accompany its well-known qualities, both in
the context of propositional logic and in the context of
Description Logics. Among the weaknesses is the fact
that one cannot separately reason property by property, so
that, if a subclass of C is exceptional for a given aspect,
it is exceptional “tout court” and does not inherit any of
the typical properties of C. Among the strengths of ra-
tional closure there is its computational lightness, which
is crucial in Description Logics. To overcome the lim-
itations of rational closure, in (Casini and Straccia 2011;
Casini and Straccia 2013) an approach is introduced based
on the combination of rational closure and Defeasible Inher-
itance Networks, while in (Casini and Straccia 2012) a lex-
icographic closure is proposed, and in (Casini et al. 2014)
relevant closure, a syntactic stronger version of rational clo-
sure.To address the mentioned weakness of rational clo-
sure, in this paper we have proposed a finer grained se-
mantics of the semantics for rational closure proposed in
(Giordano et al. 2015), where models are equipped with sev-
eral preference relations. In such a semantics it is possible
to relativize the notion of typicality, whence to reason about
typical properties independently from each other. We are
currently working at the formulation of a syntactic charac-
terization of the semantics which will be a strengthening
of rational closure. As the semantics we have proposed
provides a strengthening of rational closure, a natural ques-
tion arises whether this semantics is equivalent to the lexico-
graphic closure proposed in (Lehmann 1995). In particular,
lexicographic closure construction for the description logic
ALC has been defined in (Casini and Straccia 2012). Con-
cerning our Example 3 above, our minimal model seman-
tics gives the same results as lexicographic closure, since
T(Penguin) ⊑ HasNiceFeather can be derived from
the lexicographic closure of the TBox and T(Penguin) ⊑
HasNiceFeather holds in all the minimal canonical en-
riched models of TBox. However, a general relation needs
to be established.
An approach related to our approach is given in
(Gil 2014), where it is proposed an extension of ALC + T
with several typicality operators, each corresponding to a
preference relation. This approach is related to ours al-
though different: the language in (Gil 2014) allows for sev-
eral typicality operators whereas we only have a single typ-
icality operator. The focus of (Gil 2014) is indeed different
from ours, as it does not deal with rational closure, whereas
this is the main contribution of our paper.
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